Thirty-nine percent of US public charities with under $250,000 in annual expenses had a written conflict of interest policy; across public charities generally it was 62%.1 Those figures come from 2010 Form 990 data and nobody appears to have published a newer tabulation, so read them as an order of magnitude: the smaller the organization, the less likely the document exists, and rescues sit at the small end.
Most that do exist were copied from Appendix A of the Form 1023 instructions — the IRS's own sample policy, public domain and free to take. That is my impression from reading rescue bylaws, not a measured fact. What is a fact is the IRS's statement of the problem it solves: "A conflict of interest occurs where individuals' obligation to further the organization's charitable purposes is at odds with their own financial interests."2
Financial interests. That framing suits organizations whose scarce resource is money. A rescue's scarcest resource is a healthy, young, adoptable animal, and the conflicts that split rescue boards rarely involve an invoice. Below is a policy covering both. Change the numbers, put it to a vote.
The Policy, in Nine Articles
1. Who this covers. Directors and officers; anyone with signature authority on a bank account; anyone who approves an adoption, assigns an animal to a foster home, or authorizes veterinary spending. Collectively, "covered persons."
2. What counts as an interest. A covered person has an interest if they, a household member, or a relative (partner, parent, child, sibling, or an in-law of any of these) would: receive money, goods, services or forgiven debt from us; own or work for a business we buy from, including a veterinary practice, boarding facility, groomer or supplier; acquire an animal in our care; receive a reduced or waived fee or a place ahead of the queue; sit on the board of another organization that transfers animals to or from us; or receive placements, transport assignments or reimbursements on terms not offered to other volunteers.
3. Disclosure. Before the board discusses the matter, not after. Every covered person also signs an annual statement listing their employer, any business we might buy from, any board seat at another animal organization, and any household member active in rescue.
4. What happens next. The interested person states the material facts and may answer questions, then leaves before deliberation begins. They do not vote and are not counted in the majority. The remaining directors decide whether the transaction is fair, reasonable and in the organization's interest; the minutes record the conflict and its resolution.
5. Buying from an insider. Permitted, not banned. The board obtains at least two comparable quotes from unrelated providers, approves in advance, and minutes what the alternatives were. Under $500 in aggregate per year, disclosure plus a line in the minutes is enough.
6. Paying an insider. Any compensation, stipend or contractor fee — anything above documented actual expenses — is approved in advance by directors with no interest in it, against pay data from at least three comparable organizations in the same or similar communities, with the basis written up before the later of the next board meeting or sixty days.
7. Animals. A covered person may adopt or foster from us only if the animal was publicly listed for the same period as any other, the fee is the published fee, two people with no interest approve it (one not a director), and the adoption is minuted. Nobody places a hold on an animal before it is listed. Nobody decides which foster home receives which animal while their own household is a candidate.
8. Failure to disclose. The board informs the person, hears their account, and if it finds a failure takes corrective action up to removal — and, where money moved, seeks repayment. The finding is minuted.
9. Annual review. Once a year the board re-signs the policy and reviews every transaction from the preceding twelve months that Articles 5 to 7 would have covered.
Article 1 Decides Whether Any of the Rest Applies
The IRS sample and both statutory models reach directors, officers and key employees. In a foster-based rescue with no employees, the people making the decisions worth policing — the intake coordinator, the foster coordinator, the volunteer who holds the vet account — sit outside that circle. So Article 1 is written by function rather than title. If you can approve an adoption, you are covered. A rescue that adopts the IRS wording unchanged has a policy binding four people and a problem involving forty.
Animal Access Is a Conflict Even Though No Money Moves
Article 7 is the clause no off-the-shelf policy contains, and it is the reason to write your own.
Consider what it prohibits: a board member seeing the intake photos on Tuesday and telling the coordinator to hold the dog until Saturday; a volunteer's sister approved by that volunteer; the litter that never reaches the website because someone inside already claimed two. None of that is a financial interest under the IRS definition. All of it is the charitable purpose redirected toward a private one, and all of it is what people mean when they say a rescue has become a clique.
I would go further, and here experienced rescue people will disagree with me: insider adoptions should be minuted individually, by name, as board business. The objection is reasonable — fosters adopt their own fosters constantly, it is usually a good outcome, and a minute for each is bureaucratic theater. My answer is that the volume is the point. A rescue placing thirty animals a year with people already inside it is running a private distribution network, and it will not notice until an adopter it turned down asks why. If the paperwork feels heavy, the number is telling you something.
Banning Insider Payment Governs It Worse Than Permitting It Does
Plenty of rescues have a bylaw saying no director shall ever receive payment from the organization. That clause does more damage than the transactions it forbids. What it produces is a founder who covers the vet bill from a personal card, gets reimbursed sometimes, absorbs the rest, and is therefore the organization's largest creditor and its least documented one. Nobody has been paid, so nothing has been disclosed, so no board has approved anything. That is not the absence of a conflict. It is a conflict with no procedure attached, and it is how a rescue ends up unable to explain its own bank statement.
Federal law already supplies the procedure. Section 4958 taxes an excess benefit transaction at 25% of the excess to the person who received it, 200% more if uncorrected, and 10% to any manager who knowingly participated, capped at $20,000.3 The regulations then hand you a way out: compensation is presumed reasonable if approved in advance by a body with no conflict, on appropriate comparability data, documented concurrently.4 Under $1 million in gross receipts, "appropriate comparability data" means pay at three comparable organizations in similar communities — three phone calls, or three Form 990s off the internet — and "concurrently" means before the later of the next meeting or sixty days.4 Article 6 is that regulation restated in the second person. It costs an afternoon, and while failing to obtain the presumption creates no inference that a transaction was improper, having it moves the burden.4
A Board of Three Relatives Cannot Operate This Policy
Every clause above assumes there are directors left in the room after the interested one leaves. That assumption fails in a large share of small rescues, and no policy repairs a board that has none.
California legislated the point: not more than 49% of a public benefit corporation's board may be "interested persons" — anyone compensated by the corporation in the previous twelve months other than reasonable director's fees, plus their siblings, ancestors, descendants, spouse and in-laws.5 A violation does not invalidate the corporation's transactions; it is a composition rule, not a remedy.
Form 990 asks the same question with no rule attached: did any officer, director, trustee or key employee have a family or business relationship with any other?6 A "Yes" requires a public explanation on Schedule O. Actual transactions with insiders reach Schedule L only above $100,000 a year, or the greater of $10,000 or 1% of revenue in one transaction — thresholds most rescues never touch, which is why the internal policy has to do work the disclosure schedule will not.7
New York made the policy mandatory and listed six required contents: a definition of the conflict, disclosure and determination procedures, exclusion of the conflicted person from deliberation and vote, a prohibition on improperly influencing it, documentation of the conflict and its resolution in the minutes, and procedures for related party transactions.8 Articles 2, 3, 4 and 8 follow that order because it is the only place anyone has drafted this properly, and worth copying wherever you are.
If your board is a founder, their spouse and a friend who has never attended, the honest response is not to adopt this document. It is to recruit two directors with no stake, then adopt it.
What This Document Cannot Fix
It is not law anywhere except New York, and even there it is a floor. Form 990 Part VI states in its own heading that it "requests information about policies not required by the Internal Revenue Code."6 A rescue can answer "No" to line 12a every year and stay exempt. The reason to have the policy is that the alternative is deciding these questions one at a time, under pressure, among friends.
The comparability rule assumes comparable organizations exist. Three rescues in similar communities paying a similar role is a workable test for a shelter director. For a part-time foster coordinator in a rural county it may be unfindable, and a board that cannot get the data cannot get the presumption. I have no answer beyond documenting the search.
Article 7 will cost you volunteers. Somebody who has fostered for six years and always adopted the ones who did not thrive will read it as an accusation. The wording does not avoid that; adopting the article before there is a case is the only mitigation. And a board that adopts nine articles and consults them once is worse off than one that adopted three and reads them monthly. If you cut this down, keep 2, 4, 6 and 7.
Test It Against Last Year Before You Adopt It
Run the twelve months you have just finished through Articles 5, 6 and 7. Every payment to someone connected to the board. Every adoption by a volunteer, a volunteer's relative, or a board member's friend. Every animal that never appeared on the website.
If nothing surfaces, the policy costs one signature a year. If something surfaces, you have found the argument you would otherwise be having in eighteen months, with a specific animal and a specific name attached to it.
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Amy Blackwood, Nathan Dietz and Thomas Pollak, The State of Nonprofit Governance, Urban Institute / National Center for Charitable Statistics, September 2014. Source of both figures used here: "In 2010, 62 percent of public charities had a conflict-of-interest policy... a 12 percentage-point increase from Ostrower's 2005 findings," and, for organizations with under $250,000 in annual expenses, "39 percent had a conflict-of-interest policy." Caveats carried into the text: these are self-reported Form 990 checkbox answers from 2010, drawn from NCCS core files covering 2008–2011, in a research brief rather than a peer-reviewed paper. I could find no later national tabulation of Form 990 Part VI line 12a. Figures circulating from BoardSource's Leading with Intent are not comparable — that is a self-selected survey of board members skewed toward large organizations, not a Form 990 census. urban.org ↩
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Internal Revenue Service, Form 1023: purpose of conflict of interest policy, page last reviewed 27 June 2026. Source of the quoted definition and of the IRS's stated rationale — that the recommended policy is "a strategy we encourage organizations to adopt as a means to establish procedures that will offer protection against charges of impropriety involving officers, directors or trustees." The sample policy itself is Appendix A to the Instructions for Form 1023 (rev. December 2024), which states that it "doesn't prescribe any specific requirements" and that organizations "should use a conflict of interest policy that best fits their organizations." Its Articles run: Purpose; Definitions (Interested Person, Financial Interest); Procedures (Duty to Disclose, Determining Whether a Conflict of Interest Exists, Procedures for Addressing the Conflict of Interest, Violations); Records of Proceedings; Compensation; Annual Statements; Periodic Reviews; Use of Outside Experts. irs.gov ↩
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26 U.S.C. § 4958. Subsection (a)(1): "a tax equal to 25 percent of the excess benefit," paid by the disqualified person. Subsection (a)(2): 10 percent on an organization manager who knowingly participated, "unless such participation is not willful and is due to reasonable cause." Subsection (b): an additional "200 percent of the excess benefit involved" where it is not corrected within the taxable period. Subsection (d)(2): the manager's tax "shall not exceed $20,000" per transaction — a flat figure set by Pub. L. 109–280 in 2006, with no inflation adjustment in the section. law.cornell.edu ↩
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Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6, rebuttable presumption that a transaction is not an excess benefit transaction (eCFR, current as of September 2026; no changes to this content after January 2017). Paragraph (a) sets the three conditions: advance approval by an authorized body "composed entirely of individuals who do not have a conflict of interest"; reliance on "appropriate data as to comparability"; and documentation of the basis "concurrently with making that determination." Paragraph (c)(2)(ii) is the small-organization rule relied on here: for organizations with annual gross receipts including contributions of less than $1 million, comparability data on "three comparable organizations in the same or similar communities for similar services" suffices. Paragraph (c)(3)(ii) defines concurrent documentation as prepared "before the later of the next meeting of the authorized body or 60 days after the final action." Paragraph (e) provides that failing to obtain the presumption "neither creates any inference that the transaction is an excess benefit transaction, nor exempts or relieves any person from compliance with any Federal or state law." ecfr.gov ↩ ↩ ↩
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California Corporations Code § 5227 (amended Stats. 1996, Ch. 589): "not more than 49 percent of the persons serving on the board of any corporation may be interested persons," with "interested persons" defined as anyone compensated by the corporation for services within the previous 12 months, excluding reasonable director's fees, together with that person's brother, sister, ancestor, descendant, spouse or in-law. Subsection (d): "The provisions of this section shall not affect the validity or enforceability of any transaction entered into by a corporation." The companion self-dealing provision, § 5233, requires board approval in good faith by a majority of the directors then in office "without counting the vote of the interested director or directors," after determining that the corporation "could not have obtained a more advantageous arrangement with reasonable effort under the circumstances" — though § 5233(g) allows interested directors to count toward quorum. California only; other states differ, and most impose no composition limit at all. leginfo.legislature.ca.gov ↩
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Form 990 (2025), Part VI, Governance, Management, and Disclosure, page 6, and the Instructions for Form 990 (2025). Source of: the Section B parenthetical, "This Section B requests information about policies not required by the Internal Revenue Code"; line 12a, "Did the organization have a written conflict of interest policy?"; line 12b on annual disclosure; line 12c on regular and consistent monitoring and enforcement; Section A line 2, "Did any officer, director, trustee, or key employee have a family relationship or a business relationship with any other officer, director, trustee, or key employee?"; and the instructions' definition of a conflict as arising where a person in authority "can benefit financially from a decision he or she could make in such capacity, including indirect benefits such as to family members or businesses with which the person is closely associated." Note the distinction relied on in the text: the policies are not mandated, but answering the questions is. irs.gov ↩ ↩
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Instructions for Schedule L (Form 990), rev. December 2024, continuous use. Part IV, Business Transactions Involving Interested Persons, is reportable where payments in the year exceed $100,000; or a single transaction exceeds the greater of $10,000 or 1% of the organization's total revenue; or compensation to a family member of a current or former officer, director, trustee or key employee listed in Part VII exceeds $10,000; or a joint venture meets the stated interest tests. The instructions also warn that the "ordinary course of business" exception available at Form 990 Part VI line 2 does not apply for Schedule L purposes. irs.gov ↩
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New York Not-for-Profit Corporation Law § 715-a, conflict of interest policy. Paragraph (b) sets the six minimum contents quoted in the text; paragraph (c) requires an annual written statement from each director before initial election and annually thereafter; paragraph (d) deems a corporation compliant if it already holds a policy "substantially consistent" with paragraph (b). The related party transaction rules sit at § 715: no such transaction unless the board determines it "fair, reasonable and in the corporation's best interest," and, for a charitable corporation where the related party has a substantial financial interest, the board must consider alternative transactions and "contemporaneously document in writing the basis for" its approval. New York only. This is a description of statutes and regulations, not legal advice; the rules that bind your organization depend on where it is incorporated. nysenate.gov ↩